European Aid to Ukraine – What Should We Do?

The Central and Eastern European Security Forum: Warsaw 16/17 June 2025

The extraordinary resilience, fortitude, perseverance and courage of the people of Ukraine is bred from the turbulent past of just over one hundred years in which independence was gained briefly after the First World War but in 1922 was subsumed into the Soviet Union with a history of invasion, starvation and atrocities in its wake. There followed the appalling Holodomor or Great Famine perpetrated by Stalin’s flawed agrarian reforms in which some 4 million Ukrainians starved to death and were even prevented from fleeing the country. It was carved up by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and suffered atrocities at the hands of the Nazis and then the Soviets. The Second World War saw also that terrible fate suffered by so many European states under occupation of citizens fighting on both sides with all the legacy of mistrust that leaves. Some 6 million Ukrainians died (including 1.5m Jews). We can all understand why Ukrainians value their independence gained in 1991 (with more than 92 percent of voters approving it in a referendum), recognized now by countries (Poland and Canada being the first with Boris Yeltsin on behalf of Russia later that same day). Some 100 countries (including China and the other P5 in the Security Council) have recognized that independence.

Despite the signing of the Budapest Memorandum in 1994, in which Ukraine agreed to hand over its nuclear weapons (a first and uniquely in history) in exchange for guarantees of security and territorial integrity, Russia commenced a war against it and in 2014 annexed and then launched a proxy war in the Donbas via the breakaway Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic followed by the full invasion in February 2022. As you all know, Putin has never accepted Ukrainian independence and therein lies much of the problem. The Russian controlled area includes large mineral deposits. It is small wonder that Ukrainians put little faith in Russians and their treaties.

Ukraine must be considered an important part of Europe both because it has been the bread-basket of many countries (its grain exports are a significant part of global food security, with destinations including both developing and developed countries, some 57% going to developing countries, a large share of which goes to Africa and the Middle East) and its valuable minerals (now much in occupied Russian hands as stated). It is strategically a buffer between Europe and Russia, a fact exemplified by the war. The approach of Europe must be economic, political, military and cultural. 

I have stressed the economic importance of the country and that must be bolstered by further increases in trade in both goods and services. The cost to rebuild Ukraine is high with the World Bank and UN estimating that demining and clearing unexploded ordnance efforts alone will cost $34.6 billion over the next decade. The total cost of Ukraine's reconstruction and recovery is estimated at $524 billion over the next decade. Yet, the total value of Russian assets frozen by the UK and its allies is estimated to be around $300 billion. This figure includes both state assets and private wealth, with the vast majority of frozen assets being state reserves. The UK itself has frozen approximately £25 billion of Russian assets. This should increasingly be the source of funding reconstruction. In order to stimulate markets as well as preventing another round of starvation and civil unrest in Ukraine we must be prepared to continue substantial humanitarian and medical aid. Much is already being done but the legacy of war is not only physical loss of limbs, faculties and other disability but also deep mental trauma which in some cases will need lifelong treatment.

Politically, Ukraine was granted candidate status to the European Union on 23 June 2022 and accession negotiations officially opened on 25 June 2024: that process must not be stalled. The EU must not dangle Ukraine on a string in the way that it has with Turkey even if full accession is, realistically, more than a decade away.

Militarily it is obvious that under the current administration the USA is not a reliable partner but is it wrong to think that Europe cannot step into that breach. The 64% of arms imports by European NATO states that came from the USA in 2020-24 was the largest share in any five-year period of the past two decades but the level of reliance on US imports varies a lot depending on the types of arms. It is true that Europe's NATO members imported more than 60% of their weaponry from the US between those years and, as with the continent's reliance on Russian oil before 2022, over-dependency on a single supplier is making the continent vulnerable to political decisions taken elsewhere. The F-35 combat aircraft made by Lockheed Martin is a US-dominated programme to produce a fifth generation aircraft and relies heavily on foreign involvement - as much as 30% of the fully equipped jet is estimated to be British for example. But the F-35 is highly dependent on its US-controlled computer systems, so while talk of a disabling so-called kill switch seems overblown, it would degrade over time without coding updates and US maintenance. The UK has also raised concerns that its fleet of F-35's could be grounded by the USA. Defense minister Luke Pollard responded on 10 March saying that "the UK maintains the freedom of action to operate the F-35 Lightning at a time and place of our choosing," without giving further details. 

As the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has pointed out, however, when it comes to arms for land forces, such as tanks, armoured vehicles and artillery systems, reliance on US suppliers is low. Most European NATO states tend to buy from domestic suppliers, from other European states or from other non-European states (e.g. Israel and South Korea), but not from the USA. What really boosts the volume of arms imports from the USA in the SIPRI data is combat aircraft. European NATO states received over 150 combat aircraft and over 60 combat helicopters from the USA in the past five years and, at the end of 2024, they had another 472 combat aircraft and 150 combat helicopters on order from the USA. The European and US arms industries are deeply intertwined-through supply chains, joint ventures, licensed production deals and more. For instance, several European NATO members are involved in producing components for F-35 combat aircraft, both for themselves and for other customers. Since Russia's full-scale invasion, the USA has accounted for 45 per cent of the arms imported by Ukraine, while European NATO states together have supplied 47 per cent. European states could potentially supply more major conventional arms to Ukraine, such as combat aircraft, long-range missiles and ground-based air-defence systems if they decided to prioritize this over domestic procurement and exports to third states. 

European countries' reliance on US munitions, especially for artillery shells, has been significant, particularly after the start of the war in Ukraine, but is decreasing as Europe increases its own production. While the USA initially provided substantial military aid, including artillery shells, Europe is now actively working to boost its own manufacturing capabilities and reduce dependence on US supplies.  Rheinmetall's new artillery plant, for example, will produce up to 350,000 artillery shells annually, nearly doubling its initial target of 200,000.

Lastly, there are the cultural links which time does not permit me to examine in detail save to say that such exchanges are an important component of creating greater understanding and building further a true European heritage. 

In confirming the solid and unwavering support from the UK I wish to end looking at three possible scenarios to the end of a conflict that currently seems out of sight.

1.If the war continues because a ceasefire is unachievable (Putin clearly does not want it). Russia will gain further territory but only slowly over more years and its economy may not be able to sustain it – especially if there are further sanctions - but will the West become weary of supporting it? That is where our resolve and our support both economically and militarily must remain strong. If, however, on the other hand, there is a ceasefire will this curb Putin’s ambition? His views of the territorial reconstruction of the former glory of Mother Russia are for all to read and the similarities with the 1930s are chilling to the effect that there may well be a greater conflagration involving NATO (with which Putin is on record as claiming Russia is already at war). What will be next? The Suwalki Corridor, the Baltic states?

2. If Putin dies or is supplanted or the Russian economy implodes and the war has to end - will it end, however, with Russia retaining Crimea, Donbas or having to withdraw? If the former then it is reasonable to expect that after so much bloodshed and misery Ukraine will never accept that situation and there will be continuing guerilla warfare even in the face of mass Russian importation of Russians and peoples sympathetic to Russia. If the latter, a humiliation for Russia, what will the Western response be to a defeated Russia – the same triumphalism as in 1989/91 (despite Clinton’s efforts with Yeltsin in 1993 onwards) or Churchill’s admonition "in victory, magnanimity"? Russia wants to be respected and its place as a world leader recognized and there may just be the opportunity for a rapprochement.

3. Finally, if the West tires of supporting Ukraine and forces de facto annexation of Crimea/Donbas by Russia Ukraine will not accept this, however isolated it may be made – there will be continuing guerilla warfare and attacks on Russian "invaders" will endure and Europe will stand by as there is a slow but painful annexation of the whole of Ukraine by Russia – but for how long will that last, even with a puppet pro-Russian government in Kyiv? Does Russia really have the resources for a permanent army of occupation?

The only sensible and realistic course for Europe is to stand by Ukraine and to demonstrate that to the rest of the world for however long it takes.

Keith Best

Chair Wyndham Place Charlemagne Trust, United Kingdom

Chair Universal Peace Federation (UK)

Former British MP, OSCE Observer Ukraine Presidential Election, Chair World Federalist Movement/Institute for Public Policy

Patron The European Atlantic Movement

The views and opinions expressed in our International Insights are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views, policies, or positions of TEAM Global or its affiliates.