How U.S. Transactionalism Could Drive Multipolarity

The Return of Multipolarity?

There’s a persistent belief in international politics that disruptions are temporary, and that eventually things regress to the mean. For much of the post-World War II era, U.S. foreign policy was guided by consistent principles: global leadership, alliance commitments, and a sense of responsibility for maintaining the liberal international order. Even when presidents differed in tone or emphasis, the underlying structure remained intact.  But what if that era is over? What if U.S. President Donald Trump’s approach to foreign policy isn’t an outlier, but the beginning of a longer arc that will redefine America’s global role from strategic guarantor to strategic vendor?

One possible outcome of a permanent shift to transnationalism could be the return of multipolarity: a world in which several regional and global powers jockey for influence, without any single actor anchoring the system. The resulting international structure would be mercurial, more competitive, and more unstable. 

Three key shifts have, thus far, emerged as characteristics of the new U.S. foreign policy.  First, security is now a pay-to-play game.  Second, the U.S. intends to continue to project power, but intends to do so without permanent commitments.  Third, economic and technological competition are emerging are supplanting traditional concepts of deterrence.

Consider briefly how each of these shifts play out between now and 2035.

Security as a Pay-to-Play Game

The first casualty of transactionalism is the assumption that U.S. security guarantees are automatic. By 2035, traditional alliances still exist in name, but their substance has changed. American protection is no longer a given: it’s a negotiated service, contingent on financial contributions, strategic alignment, or direct economic return.

This shift destabilizes decades-old assumptions:

• European nations, uncertain of U.S. resolve, invest in independent deterrence or deepen intra-European defense arrangements.

• In Asia, countries like Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam hedge their bets—some by enhancing their own capabilities, others by cultivating ties with China or regional coalitions.

• Smaller nations, unsure of U.S. backing, may avoid taking bold positions on global issues altogether.

Allies no longer ask, “Will the U.S. intervene?” They ask, “What will the U.S. require in return?”This transactional logic erodes trust and accelerates the dispersion of power.

Power Projection Without Permanent Commitments

The U.S. military remains unmatched in capability, but by 2035 it no longer maintains the same level of global permanence. Large, fixed deployments give way to modular, theater-specific power projection, involving shorter rotations, lighter footprints, and faster exits.

Rather than being the world's embedded defender, the U.S. becomes its most influential arms dealer and security broker. Allies are encouraged to invest in American hardware, not rely on American boots.

This posture has consequences:

• Long-time partners question Washington’s willingness to stay in the fight if costs escalate.

• Arms sales create dependencies, but also bolster the capacity of traditional and new regional powers.

• Adversaries test the gaps, unsure if the U.S. presence in a region reflects a true red line or a temporary display.

U.S. power is still visible, but its commitment is uncertain. That ambiguity forces others to assume both more risk and more responsibility.

Economic and Technological Competition Supplant Traditional Deterrence

In this new foreign policy framework, markets matter more than militaries, at least as tools of influence. By 2035, Washington prioritizes control over supply chains, export regimes, and technological ecosystems as the front line of competition, especially against China.

This isn’t disengagement. It’s a different kind of engagement:

• Semiconductor chokepoints, AI development races, and digital infrastructure standards become strategic terrain.

• Export controls and sanctions are used more aggressively to deny adversaries access to cutting-edge technologies.

• Economic relationships are weaponized, pulling allies into spheres of influence defined not by treaties, but by code, chips, and data.

The result is a form of economic deterrence—one that is powerful, but fragile. When success hinges on compliance and access, rather than presence and protection, the rules of the game become harder to enforce.

Conclusion

A transactional U.S. foreign policy doesn’t just reduce the scope of American engagement—it restructures the global system. The result is not isolationism, nor is it pure realpolitik. It’s something more complicated: a world in which America still acts, but does so case-by-case, through deals rather than doctrine.

This approach encourages others to do the same. The guardrails that once constrained great power behavior, predictable alliances, sustained commitments, shared strategic goals—begin to weaken. What fills the vacuum is multipolarity: a world of shifting partnerships, contested regions, and rising uncertainty. It’s a future where power is still abundant, but trust is scarce.

Jeremy Boss is the co-founder of Waymark Intelligence Solutions and a former senior analyst in the U.S. intelligence community.

His work centers on transforming how leaders think about strategy, intelligence, and decision-making in an era of uncertainty.

The views and opinions expressed in our International Insights are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views, policies, or positions of TEAM Global or its affiliates.